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8.  Morocco’s political economy: Ambiguous 
 privatization and the emerging social 
 question 
 
 Myriam Catusse 
 
 
 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
Morocco is in tune with the international neo-liberal agenda. The 
politico-economic trajectories of the Kingdom, while they do not 
arouse analyses as trenchant as in Tunisia,
1
 which is presented 
alternately as a model pupil of the development therapists and as a 
counter-example of the democratic virtues of the “Washington 
Consensus”,2 are in many respects remarkable. The different reform 
measures in the arena of economic policy which have been put in 
place for more than 20 years lay claim to the dogmas of neo-liberal 
development. Resonance chamber, sometime laboratory, of this 
“modern religion”,3 Moroccan society lives its hopes and its 
disappointments. 
In these terms, the Morocco of structural adjustment, of privatisations 
and of economic liberalisation presents an interesting post from which 
to observe the reconstitutions of the powers of the state over economic 
regulation in the context of globalisation. The nature and resources of 
public power are put to the test of the opening of economic borders 
and the normalisation of markets at international level. In terms of 
political economy, alongside its historical and institutional 
specificities, Morocco can be considered in many respects to be a 
“paradigmatic” case within the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region: the Kingdom is exemplary with regard to the 
modalities, the breath and the effects of the economic reforms in 
which it has been engaged since the beginning of the 1980s. It 
sometimes plays the role of laboratory of the exercise of new 
instruments of economic policy. 
This chapter examines the logics of regulation which have developed 
since the abandoning of the “state-developmental” model and of 
Fordism,
4
 and also in the face of the weaknesses of the “neo-liberal” 
                                                        
1 Hibou (2006) sets out a subtle and well-documented analysis of the political 
economy of repression in Tunisia, the economic “good student”. 
2 Williamson 1990. 
3 Rist 2001. 
4 This model is based on the principles of the internal market as driver of growth and 
the “Taylorist” organisation of work in a business in return for salaries and growth 
in productivity (El-Aoufi 1998 and 2000). 
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compromise itself based on the classic figures of the “state as 
corrector of the market” or the “state as inciter or manipulator of 
incitement”. By studying the interactions of the economic and political 
arenas, I will discuss in particular the falsities of the hypothesis of 
“regulation through less state”. Rather than a macro-level analysis of 
the effects of the economic reforms, of their winners and their losers, 
of their perverse effects and even of their dysfunctioning,
5
 the recent 
trajectory of Morocco calls for an examination of how public action in 
the economic and social sectors is being transformed in terms of 
distribution of resources, decision-making and finally the exercise of 
power. 
A priori, within the region, the history of Moroccan political economy 
presents specific characteristics with regard to such questions. Firstly, 
the analysis in terms of a rentier or post-rentier economy such as has 
developed in the region is particularly inopportune. Certainly, the 
modern Moroccan economy is largely based on a public sector rich in 
abundant mineral resources. By means of the Office Chérifien des 
Phosphates (OCP),
6
 a public company, the public sector has provided 
a manna to successive Moroccan governments from the 1970s 
onwards.
7
 The OCP remains today the primary company in Morocco, 
with more than 300,000 employees, producing 3 percent of its GDP 
and exporting almost 30 percent of its total exports. In terms of 
exogenous revenues, the capital transfers of emigrant workers also 
represent an important inflow of currency, which the public authorities 
try with varying degrees of success to capture and channel by means 
of favourable policies.
8
 Tourism, principally European tourism, 
represents today the primary source of currency for the country, but is 
not monopolised by the public sector and cannot simply be a source of 
profit in the hands of the political authorities. In parallel, through the 
development of the food-processing and textile industry in particular, 
the Moroccan state has also been a “productive state” and still is, 
based on a widespread indirect fiscal system.
9
 It has moreover only 
been very slightly redistributive, ensuring neither high salaries nor 
generous social policies. 
Secondly, the contemporary trajectories of Morocco document in an 
original fashion thought as to the relationship between economic and 
political reforms. Rather than an analysis of the “democratising” 
                                                        
5 For a discussion of the recent literature on this subject, please cf. Catusse 2006.  
6 Moroccan Phosphates Office. 
7 Morocco has 75 percent of the world‟s phosphate reserves and the OCP holds a 
position as leader in the international market in phosphate fertilizers. In 1973, 
following the unilateral decision by Morocco to increase the price of phosphate by 
200 percent, prices rocketed, ensuring for the Kingdom a substantial profit 
throughout the 1970s. But the price of phosphate was lower during the 1980s, at the 
same time as the second petrol shock of 1979 weighed heavily on the commercial 
balance of the country. 
8 Brand 2006. 
9 On fiscal policies in the Arab world, cf. Heydemann 2004 and in particular the 
excellent study by Cammett (2004) of the Moroccan textile sector. 
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effects or on the contrary of the “authoritarian” logic of economic 
liberalisation, which is in any case partial or selective, and rather than 
an analysis of the effects of liberalisation or de-liberalisation
10
 of 
economic policies, the contemporary transformations of the political 
space in Morocco suggest an examination of the metamorphoses of 
public institutions and of the modalities of public action. Several 
correlated hypotheses can be put forward to analyse the 
reconstitutions of the economic power of the Moroccan state in the 
name of “less state”, an argument which everyone puts forward in 
order to enter the “black box” of the state11 and its institutions. By 
examining the means of privatisation of public action, I will show that 
the powers of the state are decentralised and delegated and even 
disguise themselves beneath technical rags, but remain of prime 
importance. 
The logics of “privatisation” of public action are striking. They consist 
in forms of “discharge”, to borrow the Weberian expression revisited 
by Hibou. In such processes of reform, the metamorphoses of social 
regulation through the political rests perhaps less on a disengagement 
of public power than on forms of subsidiarity or delegation. The prior 
resources and regulatory capacities of State institutions are eroded, but 
their points of intervention multiply and shift.
12
 One should therefore 
speak of a redeployment of public action. In the case of Morocco, the 
discussion is that much more interesting in that the programme of 
privatisation of the public sector launched in 1990 has shown itself to 
be ambitious and has concerned the principal economic and strategic 
sectors of the Kingdom. 
Standard neo-liberal theory and coordination “by the market” are 
indeed unable to explain these transformations. This explains the 
renewal of references to the work of Polanyi, who insists on the 
contrary on the fundamentally dual character of the liberalisation of 
the market, which has to be accompanied by the economic 
intervention of the State. Neo-liberal institutions themselves have 
revised their analyses.
13
 The Moroccan public authorities remain 
central actors in economic policies. Confronted by the 
deinstitutionalisation and destabilisation of previous systems of action, 
a lot of actors keep on resort for state. This is, furthermore, not unique 
to Morocco. Over the course of the decades of structural adjustment, 
“the equation „more market‟ equals „less state‟ has been very widely 
assumed by default, and not only in Latin America”.14 
Decentralisation and devolution are the cornerstones of the techniques 
of discharge in terms of policies of investment and in terms of social 
policy. The spheres of public action change with its delocalizations 
                                                        
10 Kienle 2000. 
11 Signoles 2006. 
12 Hibou 1999. 
13 Hibou 1998. 
14 Bafoil 2006, p. 135. 
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and re-localizations of economic policies: new spheres of economic 
modes of regulation are mapped out, as are possibly new splits and 
causes of deregulation. 
Finally, underneath, ambivalent attempts at the “depoliticization” of 
economic policies play out: the desire to set out and treat questions of 
economic choice beyond the sphere of politics and political 
competition. This clearly belongs to a relatively classic process proper 
to development and to the progressive sophistication of public policies 
leading to a call to experts or “technocrats”. But this process is 
situated also in the logic of antipolitics,
15
 which tends to marginalise 
the elected and the partisan in the fabrication of the public space. 
Examination of Moroccan economic policies, and in particular of its 
privatisations, therefore allows us to examine the construction of new 
spheres of public action and the use of new tools of government. 
Behind the slogans of adjustment, privatisation and mise à niveau, the 
powers of the state are restructured. The strictly political notions of 
public good and general interest are revisited. On the one hand, 
whether it be to deplore its state or to praise its qualities, the business 
has become over the course of these years in Morocco an “affair of 
society”.16 On the other hand, by means of decentralisation, of 
fragmentation of spheres of action and of recourse to/seizing of 
“private” actors at national or international level, the public authorities 
have discharged themselves of aspects of the political economy while 
at the same time retaining control upstream and downstream. In the 
domain of social policies and welfare, they even sometimes redeploy 
themselves behind the administration or the royal figure. In this game, 
representative political institutions are by contrast marginalised. 
In order to analyse how the catchphrase “less state” has reorganised 
the economic capabilities of public power in Morocco, and how the 
logics of privatisation, decentralisation and even depoliticization fit 
together, we will look in turn at the transformation of the modalities of 
the accumulation of wealth and of redistribution, at the evolution of 
the role of the state in social security, and finally at the reconstitution 
of wage and union relations in the context of rapid economic 
liberalisation. 
 
8.2 From one form of capitalism to another: in the furrows of 
privatisation. Accumulation of wealth and redistribution in the 
economic reforms 
The neo-liberal turning-point of Moroccan economic policy can be 
described as the passage from one form of capitalism to another: a 
metamorphosis, some adaptations but certainly not a radical transition 
from one economic state to another one different in all respects; not 
                                                        
15 For a case study of the “antipolitics machine”, see Ferguson 1990. 
16 In the sense in which Sainsaulieu (1990) develops this metaphor in the case of 
France: it is a question, for this business sociologist, of showing how far the society 
in which a company operates influences its organisation, life and even culture.   
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really a transplant or even less the importation of a mode of 
production, but an adjustment to new internal or external constraints. 
To the contrary of what one was able to observe in the regimes of 
Central or Eastern Europe for example, Morocco has not recently 
converted, properly speaking, to the market economy: property rights 
have not been restored or fundamentally transformed; before the train 
of neo-liberal reforms was undertaken, enterprises, businesses and 
private services prospered or survived alongside state enterprises. 
Moreover, the reforms undertaken from the 1980s onwards signalled 
the abandonment of the idea and of the promises of the “developer 
state” in terms of collective reference-points, representations and 
economic strategies. The norms of the “economically legitimate” 
changed rapidly and in a significant fashion between different 
borrowings and in particular between local reinventions of 
capitalism.
17
 They were also accompanied by substantial 
transformations in forms of accumulation and redistribution and in 
modalities of the government of the economic: public employment 
contracted,
18
 and with it not only the quasi-assurance of a post for 
young graduates, but also privileged access to the modest system of 
social security. Customs protection for local production was to a large 
extent dismantled, which altered the balance of power in terms of the 
extraversion or introversion of the local productive tissue. 
Figuring among the 15 most heavily indebted countries at the end of 
the 1970s,
19
 like several other countries the Kingdom was forced to 
submit to shock therapy under the auspices of the unholy trinity 
(International Monetary Fund, IMF; World Bank, WB; and World 
Trade Organisation, WTO).
20
 In 1983, a programme of structural 
adjustment was negotiated with the IMF and the WB, one of the first 
plans of its kind in the region. The principles are familiar: 
restructuring of the instruments of state intervention and reform of 
public finances, monetary policy and external trade arrangements. 
These decisions translated into a reduction in tariff protection for 
national production and the adjustment of exchange rate regulation. 
Foreign investment was again encouraged. If only 38 percent of 
imports were free in 1983, they reached 90 percent in 1995. Exchange 
rate policy was liberalised and, in 1983, the dirham depreciated. In 
parallel, price control and subsidies for products of prime necessity 
were substantially reduced. New laws were adopted in 1993 to 
organise the banking sector and the Stock Exchange and in 1996 to 
normalise and to mettre à niveau public companies, investment and 
trade. In 1989 Parliament adopted a law designating 112 enterprises, 
among them the jewels of the public sector, for privatisation. 
                                                        
17 Bayart 1994. 
18 Between 1984 and 1985, public sector recruitment fell by 80 percent (Akesbi 
2003). The slowing was maintained, at a less extreme pace, in the following years. 
19 Outstanding external debt rose from 12.9 percent in 1974 to 43.8 percent in 1982. 
Cf. Kingdom of Morocco 2006. 
20 Peet 2003. 
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In terms of its integration into the world economy, Morocco fulfilled 
the necessary conditions and acceded to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1987. It was furthermore at a conference 
in Marrakech in 1994 that the GATT became the WTO. The Kingdom 
signed a Partnership Agreement with the European Union (EU) in 
1996. In the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean process started at 
Barcelona in October 1995, the Agreement provided for the 
establishment of a free-trade area between Morocco and the EU by 
2010. The economic fabric of the country started on a process of mise 
à niveau, imprecise leitmotiv with promising overtones used with 
regard to almost all sectors, including the economic fabric but also 
justice, education, the associative fabric, etc.
21
 In 2004, the Kingdom 
signed a free-trade agreement with the United States (US) which 
confirmed the option “of the integration of the Moroccan economy 
with the world economy”.22 In other words, the protection of 
Moroccan production appeared to be dismantled while, in accordance 
with the new canons of development, expectations turned towards the 
development of a “national class of entrepreneurs […] fundamentally 
wealth creating”.23 Would an “enlightened bourgeoisie”24 form, 
bringing in its wake a liberal revolution? Would the ferment of a 
“market democracy” be put in place, as the chanters of the “new 
orthodoxy of development”25 then hoped, or at least appeared to 
believe? 
 
8.2.1 At the origin of the “great transformation”: structural 
adjustment 
The stock-taking of the structural adjustment launched in 1983 is 
nuanced. For the Ministry of the Economy and Finance, it achieved its 
macroeconomic stabilisation objectives: external debt (the current 
account balance) was reduced from 12.3 percent of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) in 1983 to 0.9 percent in 1987 and to 0.7 percent in 
2003.
26
 Thanks to the devaluation of the dirham between 1983 and 
1985, exports increased. The growth in tourist revenues and in 
transfers from Moroccans resident abroad also helped, together with 
debt reduction, to re-establish external balances. But despite the 
exceptional revenues brought in by the privatisations, the state budget 
is still today in deficit.
27
 
                                                        
21 This has been more closely studied in the case of Tunisia, where the expression 
has had a very similar fate: see Camau 1997; Cassarino 1999. 
22 Ministère des Finances et des Privatisations, “Oualalou s‟exprime sur l‟ALE 
Maroc/Etats-Unis ”, (n.d.), 
http://www.finances.gov.ma/portal/page?_pageid=33,4502299&_dad=portal&_sche
ma=PORTAL (retrieved 20 October 2008) . 
23 El-Malki 1989, p. 213. 
24 El-Malki et al. 1990, p. 291. 
25 Laïdi 1993. 
26 Ministère de l‟Economie et des Finances 1995. 
27 Debt service as a percentage of GDP and exports rose between 1990 and 1999 
(ATTAC Maroc 2005). In 2006, debt service remained high in so far as the Annual 
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ATTAC
28
 Morocco insists on the worsening of indicators of teaching, 
health and unemployment during the years of “liberal policies”.29 In 
2007, the rate of unemployment officially bordered 10 percent
30
 of the 
population, but this indicator is contested. In reality it evens out very 
marked disparities between town and country, young people and 
adults and also men and women. It does not take account either of 
situations of under-employment, informal employment
31
 or unwaged 
forms of employment.
32
 
As for the WB experts, they are of the opinion that “the 1980s were a 
period of macroeconomic stabilisation, gradual liberalisation and 
deregulation of the economy which brought about dynamic growth”.33 
But if the “stock of Morocco has without doubt gone up among 
foreign investors”, they too can only deplore the slow rate of growth 
and high rates of unemployment.
34
 
In any case, structural adjustment, strengthened by the measures of 
mise à niveau introduced in the wake of the free-trade agreements 
with the EU, was an affair of state in all the senses of the term: on the 
one hand, it was a question of transforming the economic structures of 
the state, and on the other, the Moroccan state controlled the process 
upstream and downstream. As Dillman indicates in relation to the 
Maghreb regimes put to the test of the globalisation of economies: 
 Regimes have been quite adept at maintaining patronage 
 coalitions and determining the mechanisms by which public 
 and external resources are divvied up. The most they 
 “deregulate” the most they “re-regulate” by determining 
 precisely who can most easily benefit from change and join 
 distributional coalition to tap profits in the market.
35
 
More perhaps than the relative decrease in the level of public 
expenditure,
36
 the programme of privatisation and the reduction of the 
state sector from the 1980s onwards were the pivots of the reforms. In 
fact, apart from its social consequences, to which we shall return, the 
                                                                                                                                  
Report of the Moroccan Central Bank underlined that outstanding external debt 
represented 21 percent of the entire debt of the country and 15.1 percent of GDP. 
The total outstanding direct public debt of Morocco reached 327,400 million dirham 
and increased by 11.3 percent, bringing the rate of debt to 71.6 percent of GDP. 
28
 Association pour une Taxe sur les Transactions financières pour l'Aide aux 
Citoyens (Ed. note). 
29 ATTAC Morocco 2005. 
30 Haut Commissariat au Plan 2007. 
31 According to Direction de la statistique (2003), the contribution of the informal 
non-agricultural sector to GDP is 17 percent. 
32 El-Aoufi et al. 2005/6. 
33 World Bank 1999, p. 2. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Dillman 2001, p. 202. 
36 Mouline 2005, p. 54, shows that “the structural adjustment plan 1982-1992 and 
the reforms carried out afterwards did not allow for a considerable decrease in 
public expenditure in terms of percentage of GDP. This ratio, which was 29.9 
percent during the 1970s, was brought to 26.2 percent during the 1990s and only to 
28.7 percent during the period 2000-2”. 
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structural adjustment smoothed the way for transformation of state 
interventionism in the economic arena, which illustrates particularly 
well the routes which the privatisation of the Moroccan public sector 
took. 
 
8.2.2 The crucible of privatisations 
The policy of privatisation on which Morocco embarked at the end of 
the 1980s took several forms which, taken together, transformed less 
the sociological fabric of the elites than the modalities of public 
action. If such modalities were the instrument of a reproduction of the 
elitist system, the privatisations were also the backyard of a 
transformation of the resources of the state, of a redefinition of levels 
of intervention or even of the formation of new systems of reference 
for public action, copied from the metaphors of the market. The 
emergence of the category of “entrepreneur” as the archetype of 
success and power is an example of its effects.
37
 In the image of what 
Boltanski described in relation to the middle classes in France during 
the 1930s, one can say that the 1990s figure among the “numerous 
cases where the appearance of a „new‟ group is the product of a 
structural rearrangement of long duration exercised at the same time 
over objective properties and representations”.38 
 
A law made-to-measure 
The programme of privatisation of Moroccan state owned companies 
was initially set out in the framework of Law 39-89 on privatisations, 
which listed an initial 112 and a further 114 companies to be ceded. 
Taking into consideration the financial holdings of these companies in 
other companies, they represented 40 percent of the portfolio of the 
state in 1989 when the law was adopted. Far from being lame ducks of 
Moroccan industry, this list put up for sale some jewels of the 
Moroccan public sector.
39
 It included the country‟s big industrial 
businesses (particularly in the cement, steel, petrol, phosphate and 
mining sectors), and also four of the main banks, insurance 
companies, finance companies and service companies. The range of 
privatisations was moreover extended in particular in the area of 
public services (post and telecommunications, transport, abattoirs, 
state-owned water and electricity companies, and so on). 
The sale of public companies was swiftly carried out by means of 
assignment by private contract, calls for bids, public offering on the 
Casablanca Stock Exchange and very slightly by means of the 
allocation of shares to employees. It took its course through the 
assignment or concession, in the form of the delegation of 
management but principally of concession, of public services such as 
the distribution of water and electricity and sanitation, energy sectors, 
                                                        
37 Catusse 2007. 
38 Boltanski 1979, p. 75. 
39 Bouachik 1993. 
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the treatment of household waste, public transport, 
telecommunications, and so on. 
 
Social reproduction and crony capitalism 
In the majority of cases, in the short term at least, the sale of the 
public patrimony became the occasion for often opaque recycling 
operations. It showed itself to be “a decisive means of redistributing 
resources, of reformulating social contracts and even of resettling the 
legitimacy of governments in office”.40 The public authorities 
mastered the rhythm and extent of the process.
41
 They could choose 
the companies and sectors to cede, and controlled upstream and 
downstream procedures to a great extent. 
However, the privatisations, and the neo-liberal turning-point more 
generally, concealed a double facet: on the one hand, the public 
authorities could nurture the existence of complex politico-economic 
networks by engaging in “crony capitalism”,42 while on the other they 
could also obtain additional funds in a period of budgetary reduction 
so as to establish new economic means of regulation. 
Bearing in mind the speed with which the privatisations were carried 
out in Morocco, they profited first of all the elites and groups of 
individuals who already held concentrations of considerable personal 
capital and significant material or social resources. Stark comes to the 
same conclusion as regards the countries of Central or Eastern Europe, 
where the elites in place before the transition towards a market 
economy captured the benefits of the privatisations where they took 
place most quickly.
43
 In the case of Morocco, the “incestuous” nature 
of the procedures is all the less astonishing in view of that fact that the 
economic transition did not bring about, nor was accompanied by, a 
major transformation of the political system, a rupture of the system or 
even the eviction of a nomenclature. 
In general terms and at the half-way stage, the privatisations have 
been fruitful for a limited number of Moroccan investors and big 
foreign groups.
44
 If they had the avowed aim of extending the 
country‟s entrepreneurial class, they had on the contrary the tendency 
to concentrate the country‟s capital to an even greater extent. An 
examination of the principal operations quickly shows the almost 
systematic presence of just a few groups in the offers and in the 
purchase operations. Omnium Nord Africain (ONA),
45
 the “jewel in 
the crown”,46 and SIGER (anagram of regis, “of the king”), the private 
holdings of the royal family, were certainly the principal national 
                                                        
40 Bafoil 2006, p. 135. 
41 Kernen (2004) demonstrates the same thing as regards the policies of 
privatisations in the industrial town of Shenyang in China. 
42 Sadowski 1991. 
43 Stark 1996. 
44 For further details of later operations, see Catusse 2007. 
45 Omnium North Africa. 
46 Diouri 1992, p. 178. 
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winners from the privatisations by dint of their purchase of the 
National Investment Company, privatised in 1994. For ONA, it was 
the occasion to deploy a “multi-sectoral strategy [in] food processing, 
mining, automobiles, deep-sea fishing, the textile industry, tourism, 
real estate, communications and high technologies”.47 Together with a 
few other big groups (Benjelloun, Kettani, Akhennouch, etc.), they 
could “reinforce their acquired positions and diversify in all 
directions”.48 Keeping to this level of analysis, it is clear that neither 
the practices of riding power and of economic accumulation, nor the 
logic of profit-seeking, have been eliminated in Morocco by means of 
the privatisations. Quite the reverse. 
The mechanisms of concentration of capital and accumulation of 
wealth and power have first of all political explanations: assignments 
were made in the majority of cases by private contract, often at the 
Palace and rarely transparently. The institutions created as the 
occasion demanded were made up of personalities chosen at the 
discretion of the King: this was the case with both the Committee of 
Transfers charged with giving its opinion on the programme and the 
evaluation body whose role was to fix the minimum offer price for a 
shareholding or for the establishment to be ceded. As regards the 
management of state-owned companies and services subject to 
concession, which supervises the delegated management operations of 
public services, this is under the direct control of the Minister of the 
Interior. 
The logic of reproduction also has more structural stimuli, relating in 
particular to the conditions of access to credit, which have been 
controlled by the big banks of the Kingdom, themselves either public 
establishments (in particular the Banque Populaire Group) or 
privatised for the benefit of the principal groups of the Kingdom (the 
BMCE
49
 for the Benjelloun group, Attijariwafa bank for the Kettani 
group and ONA). 
Other practices surround privatisation, accentuating these tendencies. 
Examples of public companies repurchased by their former managers 
or shareholders are numerous, particularly in the hotel and petrol 
industries.
50
 Sometimes, today‟s purchasers are the European 
companies which had been forced to cede to the Moroccan state a 
significant share of their capital during the 1970s, in accordance with 
the provisions of the Moroccanization laws of 1973. So much so that 
                                                        
47 Saïd Saadi 2006. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Banque Marocaine du Commerce Extérieur (Ed.note). 
50 There are the cases, for example, in the petrol sector of assignments by direct 
allocation from Shell Maroc to Shell Petroleum International, from CMH to 
Hogespar, from Dragon-Gaz to Dragonifa, from Mobil Maroc to Mobil Petroleum 
Corporation, and from Total Maroc to Total outre mer. One can also cite the 
purchase of companies, such as that of Sochepress, a press distribution company, by 
its own general manager from the time when it was public. The same type of case 
can be found in the hotel industry. 
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some described the privatisations as the “demoroccanization” of the 
public sector.
51
 Far from being a source of clear and decisive rupture, 
from this point of view the privatisations ensured above all the passing 
of the baton of continuity. 
Finally, the modalities of the restructuring of the powers of the state 
through privatisation express themselves most particularly in the 
political uses of the resources produced by the assignment of public 
companies. This question, raised by opposition Members of 
Parliament at the time of the adoption of the law, was reawakened in 
1999/2000 by the case of the allocation of a substantial part of the sale 
of the second GSM (mobile telephony) licence to the Hassan II Fund 
for Economic and Social Development, an institution created ad hoc 
by the Palace in 2000. This decision, taken at the Palace, had the result 
of taking the profits of the privatisation out of the budget without any 
governmental or ministerial control. Criticised as much by financial 
backers as by a part of the press that penetrated into ministerial 
cabinets, it clearly showed as much a “strategy of confusion of 
existing budgetary procedures as a form of privatisation of public 
action”.52 The Palace relieved the government and Parliament of the 
management of this exceptional manna after they were removed from 
control of the operation of the privatisation of the licence itself. In the 
face of complaints, the Hassan II Fund finished by reintegrating the 
budget, but in the form of a special account managed by royal 
advisers.
53
 It should be noted that apart from Maroc Telecom, the 
Hassan II Fund also received part of the receipts of the privatisations 
of the Régie des Tabacs (the state-owned tobacco company), the four 
sugar refineries and SOMATHES.
54
 
The privatisations therefore allowed for the reinforcement of certain 
economic structures of the Moroccan state, but also contributed to 
undermining other tools of public action in the longer term, or even to 
inaugurating new ones. They were also a means for the public 
authorities to direct social and political claims towards intermediary 
targets, designated as those chiefly responsible for the economic state 
of the country.
55
 
 
The varied territories of economic regulation 
The economic context has evolved, and not only in detail or in 
appearance. Earlier techniques of enrichment are adapting. One has to 
adjust to the liberalisation of trade and the disappearance of sectoral 
monopolies. Privatisations have been a tool of choice for reinforcing 
mutual dependencies, for sanctioning and for correcting the economic 
fabric “top down”. They have been like the processes of 
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Marocconization in their time, a providential manna for the 
development of the fortunes of certain families or groups. But they 
have also enduringly and structurally changed the rules of the game. 
If the large transfers of resources from the “public” to the “private” 
have concentrated power and wealth in several sectors, they have also 
shifted the sites of the political control of the economy and changed 
the instruments of that control: for example, the slow development of 
the Stock Exchange is solidly supported by stock exchange companies 
themselves, in the lap of the banks and the big private groups of the 
Kingdom. Nevertheless, the Exchange welcomes a generation of 
economic operators attempting new routes to success. In all cases, 
whether it be a question of large-scale operations of assignment of 
public companies or more modest sales, sales were negotiated or 
disputed even when they were made by private contract or outside the 
frameworks fixed by the law. The shadow of ONA and the royal 
interests in these reconstitutions of capital is determinant, although 
this does not prevent them from being subject to competition from 
other groups, for example the Benjelloun family in the banking sector. 
Other observations deserve attention. Cammett shows that: 
 The combination of a new export-oriented trade regime and 
 rising international manufacturing opportunities initiated 
 important changes in the composition of the private sector [...] 
 Thus a substantial group of small-scale producers from modest 
 backgrounds emerged alongside traditional protectionist elites, 
 who dominate the textile sector.
56
  
In the field of professional relations, such transformations of the 
economic fabric translated into new types of conflict, which could be 
observed for example at the time of the negotiations for the adoption 
of a new Labour Code in 2003, when Fédération des Industries 
Textiles et de l'Habillement (AMITH)
57
 led a revolt against the 
positions taken by the management of Confédération Générale des 
Entreprises du Maroc (CGEM).
58
 While the then Prime Minister, D. 
Jettou, who was particularly heavily involved in the social 
discussions, was nothing less than the former President of AMITH, its 
President, S. E. Mezouar, future Minister of Trade and Industry and 
currently Minister of Finance and the Economy, virulently disputed 
certain measures, in particular as regards union representation and 
above all the decision to increase the guaranteed minimum wage.
59
 
Together with other internal splits in the business world, this dispute 
seriously endangered the re-election of the President of CGEM, H. 
Chami, some months later. 
Moreover, after almost twenty years of privatisation, the public 
authorities are no longer the principle employers in the country, all the 
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more in that they are no longer in charge of the provision of basic 
public services. Added to reform of the public administration, this led 
to a remarkable reduction in the privileged power resource that was 
redistribution by means of public employment and impacted, as we 
shall see, on the field of wage and union relations. 
Economic liberalisation has also been accompanied by a shifting of 
the territories of investment policies. In the context of off-shoring at 
the Euro-Mediterranean and global levels, the reorientations of 
Moroccan economic policy have given shape to new levels of 
governance, as follows. 
On the one hand, the devolution to multinationals of the provision of 
collective services, previously in the hands of state-owned companies, 
has, although not new, taken on remarkable proportions. It has been 
accompanied by a transfer of competence over entire areas of 
collective questions to national or international private groups, often 
to the detriment of the local collectivities.
60
 Those collectivities 
impose themselves like private actors in the reconstitution of public 
policies. Their measures, strategies and territories of intervention do 
not necessarily contradict the public policies of national development 
and urbanism, but they can generate conflicts over the occupation 
and/or use of space: the territories of intervention of the private 
electrification company are not the same as those of the electoral 
ward, nor, to an even lesser extent, as those of the “legal” or “illegal” 
town, for example. 
On the other hand, in January 2002, the Royal Letter concerning the 
“decentralised management of investment” and its implementing 
decrees redefined the relevant territories of economic policy by 
entrusting to the walis (prefects) of any given region the decentralised 
management of investment (“local economic and social 
development”). Dispossessing the economic ministers of certain of 
their prerogatives, the King ordained the creation, under the tutelage 
of those local authorities, which were placed under his authority, of 
Regional Investment Centres (RIC) to act as single points of contact 
for Moroccan and foreign economic operators wishing to invest 
locally. 16 RIC were created in 2002/3. In this new cartography of 
economic policies, the walis, charged normally with security policy in 
the Kingdom, gained significant competences in the field of economic 
policy in a movement of redeployment of the political centre. 
Finally, the operations of privatisation interfered in the more 
individualised relations of the citizen with the administration, not 
without notorious instances of resistance. They transformed users and 
right-holders into “clients”, which incited numerous mobilisations. 
Zaki for example shows how the programmes of electrification of the 
shantytowns of Casablanca, following the signature of a contract of 
delegated management with Lydec, subsidiary of the Suez group, 
provoked local mobilisations, pillaging and negotiations between the 
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local authorities and representatives of the private companies.
61
 As for 
Allain Mansouri, she insists on the role of the mobilisation of unhappy 
users in the renegotiation of the contract of REDAL (the state-owned 
water company) at Rabat-Salé.
62
 This contributes, without any doubt, 
to transforming the terms of the social contract and the exercise of 
economic citizenship. 
Structural adjustment and the policy of privatisation have therefore 
ploughed new furrows for the Moroccan political economy. Fixed on 
the recommendations of development institutions which worship at 
their altar, their reorientations are ambivalent. The social 
performances of the Kingdom are in the spotlight. Growth rates are 
weak. But the rhythm and extent of its privatisation programme are 
unique and acknowledged, by the reformers, as essential tools for the 
relaunching of the economy and of investment in the face of the 
incompetence of public actors. Neither the structures nor the actors of 
the Moroccan economy have been subject to radical shocks during the 
reforms, but Moroccan capitalism has nevertheless undergone 
significant transformations. 
 
8.3 From the abandonment of regulation by the state to the stakes 
of regulation by the market: the role of the state in the 
reconstitution of social security 
Among other changes, structural adjustment and privatisation to 
stimulate the private class of entrepreneurs signal the abandonment of 
a model of welfare by means of public employment.
63
 This model, 
less decisive in Morocco than in other countries in the region, had 
greatly influenced representations and practices surrounding social 
expectations with regard to the state.
64
 The reorientation of economic 
policy had at least two consequences in this regard: on the one hand, 
rates of unemployment increased, and on the other social risks 
accrued. From the end of the 1980s, protest against the repercussions 
on employment of economic liberalisation became a permanent 
feature of the landscape of Moroccan social movements due to the 
“unemployed graduates”.65 
At the same time, as in several countries in the region, the policy of 
debt reduction entailed, at its very beginning, a suppression of, or 
drastic reductions in, consumption subsidies. Combined with the 
political claims, these measures rapidly incited popular movements 
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which certain observers called, a little hastily, and with little regard to 
the political claims which accompanied them, “bread riots” or “IMF 
riots”.66 Followed by severe repressions which extended the powers of 
the Minister of the Interior, D. Basri, this “revision of policies of 
compensation connected to the contraction of rentier resources broke 
the tacit pact of state clientelism and rendered the perception of 
inequalities intolerable”,67 as was observed in the case of Tunisia by 
Camau and Geisser. 
The social malaise is far from having disappeared. It is not a residual 
problem of adaptation quickly to resolve policies which are 
compensatory in the short-term while waiting for the virtuous benefits 
of liberalisation to profit everyone. As in several countries subject to 
such drastic and speedy reforms, 25 years after the adoption of the 
programme of structural adjustment, social risks seem to have been 
exacerbated. This is shown by the mobilisations from autumn 2006 
onwards against the high cost of living by human rights associations, 
unions, radical left movements and alterglobalization associations. 
Behind slogans such as “a privatised Morocco is a deprived 
Morocco”, the demonstrators demanded the improvement of public 
services, an increase in salaries and an end to “the process of erosion 
of purchasing power”. Alongside social movements for or against the 
plan of integration of women in development or mobilisations for the 
recognition of the years of terrorism, or even behind Islamic or Berber 
identity reference points, themselves crucial poles of political protest 
at the turn of the 2000s,
68
 social problematics impose themselves as 
collective causes of the first order: the pauperisation of society, 
unemployment of young graduates, reduction in purchasing power, 
access to basic public services –water, electricity, health, education, 
transport etc.– are now on the agenda of protest. The harsh repression 
to which they are subject increases the importance of the question and 
its political weight.
69
 
The placing on the agenda of the social question in Morocco is 
therefore very closely connected to the transformations which its 
capitalism is undergoing. But the search for solutions and innovative 
means of social regulation, on the labour market or elsewhere, is 
conditioned by the constraints which weigh on the political economy 
of the country. When trade is liberalised, the importance of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) increases.
70
 This constitutes a serious obstacle 
to the developments of social safety nets. Competing with East 
European or Asian labour markets for comparative advantages, the 
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countries of the Maghreb seek to make use of structures and forms of 
employment. According to this way of thinking, low-salaried workers 
and flexible labour law are advantageous. The cleaning-up of the 
public sector obstructs the access to employment of an increasing 
number of active workers. The effects of the transformation of labour 
markets in a society with not only very low wage levels but whose 
short-term comparative advantage in international trade rests largely 
on the logic of social dumping complexify the “social question”. 
It is in such a context that, since the beginning of the decade and the 
ascendancy of a new sovereign to the throne and of the Secretary-
General of the Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP)
71
 to the 
head of government from 1998 to 2002, a triple train of reform was 
undertaken: firstly, in the field of professional relations, negotiations 
became triangular, with employers included as a “social partner” and 
discussions in the business world influenced. Secondly, in the 
legislative field, new important social laws, in particular a new Labour 
Code,
72
 a new law on accidents in the workplace
73
 and a law on 
compulsory sickness insurance,
74
 were adopted after years or even 
decades of blockage. Finally, welfare for the “unprotected” was 
reorganised with, as a beacon measure, the announcement in 2005 of a 
National Initiative for Human Development (NIHD):
75
 orientated 
towards private actors and institutions, it is strongly and very 
ambitiously organised by the public authorities, for whom it is a 
priority. 
Alongside the implementation of generic models of treatment of social 
risk proposed by international financial institutions which privilege 
methods of welfare through insurance (which are therefore individual 
and private), the metamorphoses of social regulation through the 
political in Morocco rest above all on forms of subsidiarity or 
delegation, in other words, through forms of discharge. The 
ambivalences of regulation “through less state” are flagrantly exposed. 
In place of a schema of binary regulation, whereby the social 
developmental state protects wage earners through the extension of 
public employment and the offer of social and health services, while 
local or national charitable institutions take care of the “rest”, new 
arrangements, employing several methods of co-management of social 
risk, emerge. 
 
Failure of the social state 
We should note that during the preceding decades, differently from 
other countries in the region, the Moroccan state showed itself 
particularly modest in terms of providing social security for its 
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citizens. If one could have thought of the state, during the golden 
years of development, as “the alpha and omega of the moment, under 
the double aspect of the state as demiurge and the state as provider”,76 
the model of regulation of social risks by the state in Morocco was 
very modest and collapsed. 
If the seeds of a social question emerged with the globalisation of the 
Moroccan economy, it is less the result of a brutal disengagement on 
the part of the state than because economic liberalisation accentuated 
the weaknesses of an already modest state social security system. The 
Kingdom is badly placed on the Index of Human Development of 
UNDP, including among Arab countries. It is classified, together with 
its neighbours Tunisia and Algeria, among countries with “average 
human development”. From 117th place globally in 1995, Morocco 
slipped to 123
rd
 place in 2005 out of 177 countries ranked.
77
 In 
particular, its scores for education were adverse. Morocco is placed 
among the worst in the world as regards the level of education 
rurally.
78
 In 1998/9, 48.3 percent of the population of over 15 years of 
age was classified as unable to read or write, 83 percent of the women 
of whom were living in a rural environment. If the 1980s were marked 
by a lowering of the indicators of relative poverty, the following 
decade saw a significant increase in the percentage of the population 
living beneath the poverty line. According to a survey of the domestic 
standard of living carried out in 1998/9,
79
 19 percent of the Moroccan 
population was living under the poverty line, as opposed to 13 percent 
in 1990/1, while the “economically vulnerable” population living just 
above this line had also increased. By 2005 the figure would be 25 
percent.
80
 The worsening of these indicators, which went on beyond 
1992 and the end of the main programme of structural adjustment, 
indicates that they could not simply be imputable to the short-term 
consequences of neo-liberal reform. 
In this context, the idea of a “social question”, “itself sowing the seeds 
of a questioning of the existing system”,81 emerged around the 
discourse of the “endangering” of society and even of its regime.82 
With the new forms taken by Moroccan capitalism, the previous social 
compromises appeared suspended in a “time of doubt”83 which 
accompanied the search for innovative tools of regulation. The 
“social”, up to now essentially envisaged as a question secondary to 
growth and economic performance, became a source of major political 
concern at the top of the state‟s agenda. 
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The seeds of a social question 
Beyond the movement of the unemployed graduates, what worried the 
public authorities, and incontestably destabilised the regime, in the 
1990s/2000s was on the one hand the intensification of the effects of 
media coverage of clandestine migration to Europe, in particular that 
of young people who took to the skiffs of fortune to cross the straits of 
Gibraltar, risking their lives, and on the other the increasingly 
noticeable levels of participation in religiously-motivated political 
mobilisation. 
If it is necessary to examine these two phenomena and their 
sociological motivations very carefully, let us simply underline that 
the one as much as the other is the object in the Kingdom of the same 
kind of dominant explanation, strongly debateable for that matter, 
which puts the “social state” and its (under)performance in the 
spotlight. The fight against emigration (clearly subject to international 
and particularly European pressure) takes the form of not only security 
measures of border-control but also the establishment of social 
protection networks which identify likely candidates for departure on 
a local basis. Islamic political mobilisation has been ostensibly 
expressed for example by the results recorded by the Party for Justice 
and Development in the last local and parliamentary elections, and by 
the speeches of unofficial organisations, such as the Justice and 
Spirituality Association (al-‘Adl wal-Ihsan).84 Without any direct link, 
other, more violent political forms of action have mobilised Islamic 
references in recent years, like the attacks carried out at Casablanca in 
May 2003. Certain quick analyses connect extreme poverty, social 
malintegration and Islamic engagement. The public authorities, like 
the majority of the Moroccan media, explain this sort of action in 
terms of the instrumentalization of social exclusion associated with 
acts of charity and mutual help in disadvantaged areas. 
Of course, radical engagement or engagement behind populist 
ideologies does not necessarily directly correlate to socio-economic 
data.
85
 The equation “Islamist mobilisation equals the expression of 
social misery” requires some nuancing.86 In the shantytowns of 
Casablanca, political mobilisation is far from being reduced to the 
Islamic option and even less to the passage to violence.
87
 But one 
must conclude that it is a dominant explanation for the reorientation of 
public measures of social risk management. 
In this context, new political methods of taking charge of social issues 
emerge. As often in developing countries, the underperformance of 
public measures to ensure real and tangible social security for all 
citizens encourages the return of private, public or mixed charity. 
Alongside the strengthening of social rights, public welfare, 
                                                        
84 Tozy 1998. 
85 Traïni 2003. 
86 Burgat 2005. 
87 Zaki 2005. 
  
19 
unfortunately presented as harmful and secondary by neo-classic 
theory, is strengthened in new ways, opening new spaces of 
intervention for the state. 
 
Co-managing social risks 
The creation of quasi-public institutions which are not subject to 
parliamentary control and involvement with the world of associations 
or, to a lesser extent, with that of “local communities”, like the failure 
of partisan governments and ministers to follow through the reforms 
they instigate, have led to the formation of public arenas for the 
treatment of social policies characterised by their apparent 
depoliticization, their sectorization and a heightened recourse to 
discharge. 
In the area of the fight against exclusion and poverty, recourse has 
been had to welfare and solidarity, ad hoc and private, supported by 
the development of local or international associations, and to 
sponsorship or private financing. As regards the remarkable 
development of associations with economic or social vocation, some 
are of the opinion that “the decline of the provider state and the 
progress of liberal economic ideology have been accompanied by a 
rehabilitation of the notion of profit, a new eulogy of private initiative 
and a re-evaluation of the company”, which has been particularly 
important in the creation of associations giving help to micro-
enterprises.
88
 In this arena, the initiative has not always come from the 
public authorities. In several cases, reconstitutions of public action 
have been fed by effervescent associative activity, which such action 
encouraged to develop and sought to capture, as is indicated by the 
adoption of a new law on associations in 2002. If certain of its 
provisions were judged positive by the world of associations, others 
provoked reservations or even mobilisations within this dense fabric 
of organisations: the text was “liberal” as far as the exercise of the 
freedom of association was concerned. Nevertheless, the Minister of 
the Interior remained the organ of government responsible for the 
regulation and supervision of associations. Above all, “foreign 
financing” and “political” activities could be heavily sanctioned, 
which “placed the associative movement in a situation of provisional 
freedom and under constant threat of sanction and dissolution”.89 
The metamorphoses of public action have sometimes found fertile 
ground of a particular sort in the vagaries of the “enlightened 
entrepreneurs”, a collection of individuals or groups who, modernising 
the classic practices of notables, have taken the floor and moved to 
action in the public arena with more or less elitist and political 
motives.
90
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Foundations giving help in the form of microcredit
91
 have developed 
at the interface of classic forms of sponsorship, social development 
and the promotion of the entrepreneurial spirit. If some such 
foundations have clearly been “private”, others have been much more 
closely tied to political and public institutions. The Zakoura 
Foundation, the Banque Populaire Foundation and the al-Amana 
(“insurance”) Association have been supported by Moroccan banks, 
the Hassan II Fund and numerous international development agencies. 
In 1999, a new law gave a boost to microcredit associations, framed 
their development and gave them an institutional dimension. These are 
active and effective bodies, counting thousands of lenders. Their 
development, at the intersection of institutions and public and private 
initiatives, shows how new niches of public action develop where 
hybrid forms of management of social development are used. 
The metamorphoses of government in this domain are articulated 
around two main fault lines: on the one hand, a seizing of private, 
individual and associative activities to discharge itself not only of 
social mechanisms but also of social responsibilities; on the other, 
new methods of control, in this case less through constraint than 
through centralisation of resources. If social policies are increasingly 
co-managed on the basis of partnership, it is by means of a capture 
and redistribution by the central administration of private or 
international resources. The state, whose budget is contracting, 
disposes of external capital to redeploy its social action: the public 
authorities try to position themselves on the chessboard of social 
policies as coordinators of the action of the associative fabric which 
has developed as a new privileged and credible recipient of 
international development aid. 
Together with the development of microcredit, this phenomenon has 
been particularly visible in the most recent reorientations of social 
welfare policies. The announcement by King Muhammad VI in May 
2005, two years after the attacks at Casablanca, of the NIHD 
constituted a key point in these adjustments. No fundamental reform 
of employment policy, no change in the chosen macroeconomic 
model, it was a question instead of treating, by means essentially of 
housing policies and policies of encouragement for microcredit, the 
problems of “poverty”, “social exclusion” and “insecurity”. 
The WB began to offer technical and financial assistance to the NIHD 
from September 2005 onwards. Its proposed objectives were 
extremely ambitious and grouped around three priorities financed 
from the budget and also from redistribution of international 
development aid: “strengthening the fight against poverty in rural 
areas”, “reducing social exclusion in urban areas” and “stepping up 
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the fight against precarious living conditions”. 
The first institutions established in the framework of the NIDH were 
created “top down” and supported by decentralised administrations of 
the Ministry of the Interior. Celebrated in the media, glorified by the 
royal seal and reported very ambitiously, the NIDH signals a 
reorientation of public action with respect to Moroccan social security. 
The initiative is still in its infancy, but one can already discern certain 
elements. Its function is to centralise and coordinate action. In this 
respect, it is an extension of the creation of several institutions in 
recent years, namely the Agency for Social Development of 1999 and 
the Ministry of Social Development, Family and Solidarity of 2004. 
Above all, the NIDH follows on from the creation of two beacon 
institutions of the reign of Muhammad V: the Muhammad V 
Solidarity Foundation and the Hassan II Fund for Economic and 
Social Development. 
The Muhammad V Foundation and the Hassan II Fund were 
inaugurated amid great celebrations at the end of the 1990s. They are 
hybrid structures directed by advisers close to the King and by bank 
managers, private and public positions. They are financed through 
exceptional channels, making use, more precisely, of an exclusive 
method of management of funds of often public origin. This is 
particularly so in the case of the Hassan II Fund, which benefited from 
a significant part of the concession of the second GSM licence in 
2001. These two bodies, the spearhead of the “social monarchy”, have 
not so far been subject to any governmental or parliamentary control 
or any other similar control, and function essentially in a discretionary 
manner under the royal eye. Nevertheless, they have been gradually 
integrated within the public institutions, for example by the 
transformation of the Hassan II Fund into a public body in December 
2001. Their status, between public and private, is ambiguous. Their 
field of action is not regulated by law, nor by a relationship with 
citizens, as if one was trying to define and supply services to the 
“needy” without giving them rights over the state in return. 
As is the case with the 26/26 Fund in Tunisia, the institutionalisation 
of the Muhammad V Foundation and the Hassan II Fund and of the 
NIDH has had a populist function, namely to show that social 
questions are on the public agenda and that the Palace, as the principal 
promoter of such questions, is involved as leader in the affair, 
although at the same time the direct financial resources of the state are 
being reduced. Their titles themselves confirm the implicit recognition 
of collective problems sufficiently wide for each person to see himself 
in them: “human development”, “economic and social development”, 
“solidarity”. The multi-sectoral character of the NIDH has reinforced 
this feeling. The machinery of these Moroccan social institutions is 
clearly less well-oiled than that of the Tunisian 26/26 Fund, at least in 
its repressive and coercive aspect.
92
 Indeed, the solidarity campaigns 
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of the Muhammad V Foundation have been based on collective 
popular participation and on an appeal to national solidarity in which 
each citizen can play his part and show his support for the programme. 
Unlike what could be observed in relation for example to the 
obligatory subscriptions for the construction of the Hassan II mosque 
in Casablanca,
93
 in this case the collection of funds have not taken 
place by means of a systematic and “obligatory gift” by all companies. 
The resources of these institutions do not rest on a disguised and 
subjugated system of taxation, but rather on the capture of public 
goods and international aid. 
Whatever the case might be, since their creation, the Muhammad V 
Foundation and the Hassan II Fund, presented as “crisis authorities” 
created in the name of national solidarity to confront growing social 
insecurity, have acted by regularising and placing on contractual terms 
their partnerships with associations and big private groups. The 
Muhammad V Foundation, like the Agency for Social Development, 
is managed by mixed administrative councils bringing together 
representatives of the public administration and an adviser to the 
King, we well as representatives of the private and associative 
sectors.
94
 As far as the operation of the NIDH itself is concerned, it is 
based on the principle of decentralised partnership with the economic 
and associative sectors. 
Not only do these recent institutions render private activities public, 
but they institutionalise those activities and regularise them in a 
mechanism of action which is alternative to that of the representative 
political institutions. It would evidently be necessary to bottom out the 
analysis of each of these new mechanisms, their methods of financing 
and logics of redistribution. They give birth to new forms of state 
interventionism in domains where one generally speaks, conversely, 
of its disengagement. It is not a question of overstating the 
competences and resources of public power, but of showing that, 
behind the reforms, the Moroccan public authorities are redeploying 
economic and social institutions by having recourse to the private and 
by capturing national and international resources directed towards 
development. 
Without being anachronistic, certain parallels could be drawn with the 
“social intervention” in the Europe of the industrial revolution. This 
constituted to a great extent a paradoxical solution found by 
“bourgeois” legislators to contain the political pressure of the masses, 
confront the risk of revolution and silence workers‟ claims in France 
for example.
95
 The quest for social peace becomes a priority for the 
public authorities. 
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In the developing “partnerships” between public authorities and 
private actors, the discussion of the modalities of help for the least-
protected seems to become situated in a depoliticized context. This 
does not mean either that it is not political, or that the state is 
detaching itself from it: quite the contrary. In this sense, the 
privatisation of public action consists in redistributing responsibilities, 
in redrawing the boundaries of what belongs to the public and what to 
the private, and finally in transforming the modes of regulation of 
social risk. The public authorities find other instruments to exercise 
their authority and control the basic mechanisms of the reconstitution 
of Moroccan capitalism. A range of actors, having flexible relations 
with the political and with the administration, find niches for their 
aspirations, being their appetite for power, their desire for action or, in 
certain cases, their search for social recognition. 
 
8.4 From class conflict to social dialogue: reconstitution of 
professional relations 
The metamorphoses of Moroccan capitalism have also been the 
theatre of important changes in unionism and workers‟ institutions. 
The expression “of a concern about the ability to maintain the 
cohesion of a society”, to borrow the phrase of Castel,96 and the 
conviction that the forms which the working class takes cannot ensure 
the social integration of the great majority of the population had 
already been formulated during the colonial period, when they were 
closely associated with the nationalist movement. In the 
developmental period, they were rather overwhelmed by the 
construction of the independent state. With neo-liberalism, they have 
been exacerbated in several areas. 
Wage relations have become more flexible, have been individualised 
and protect workers less and less. The “social worlds of business”97 
have been put to the test of liberalisation, privatisations and 
increasingly savage forms of capitalism. As if by a balancing effect, 
this has been translated, on the stage of professional relations and 
business policy, into the precarious but lasting establishment of new 
institutions of regulation of the labour market. At the end of the 1990s, 
novel structures of tripartite negotiation –workers‟ unions, public 
authorities and employers– were organised which inaugurated a mode 
of political management of wage policies which openly broke with the 
tradition of direct face-to-face confrontation between workers‟ unions 
and the employer State.
98
 The emergence of such structures of social 
dialogue is evidence less of an effective pacification of the business 
world than of a political will to pacify it by means of instruments 
which have shown their worth elsewhere. 
Morocco presents an interesting observation-post in this respect as 
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well. As a result simultaneously of its own historical trajectory, 
particularly the history of its unionism, which is pluralist and political, 
and of the particularities of the social configuration which is 
emerging, the routes which wage-related and professional negotiations 
have taken against this background are, if not atypical, at least 
remarkable. 
The triangulation of social negotiations consisted in the entry of the 
employers‟ class, specifically the CGEM, then in 2003 the Chambers 
of Commerce and Industry, as an institutionalised and normal 
“partner”. Indeed, the GCEM had already been associated with social 
discussions in the past, but in the context of discussions between the 
public authorities and the workers‟ unions. From 1996 onwards, 
separate consultation authorities established the spheres of influence 
of the social “partners” and the public authorities, who have sought 
the role of arbiter of interests at stake (particularly the Minister of the 
Interior and then the Prime Minister). Other than the assumption of the 
participation of employers in business policy, this appears to me to 
have two important consequences in terms of public policy and the 
restructuring of the powers of the state: firstly, in a context of 
aggravation of social contradictions and rapid transformation of the 
labour market, the wage discussion is removed from the political 
arena and relegated to the business world. Secondly, the recognition of 
this third social “partner”/“opponent”, which is based on the voluntary 
promotion of a pacified model of social relations, has presided over an 
important legislative output in terms of labour law. The adoption after 
several decades of blockage of a new Labour Code in 2003 and a law 
on compulsory sickness insurance are the most striking examples of 
this.
99
 
The mode of social representation sketched out in these reforms attests 
to at least two dynamics: on the one hand, it has strengthened the 
formation of the interest group of “entrepreneurs”, who are put to their 
collective responsibilities and summoned, finally, to play a role in a 
co-management of economic and social policies; on the other, it has 
formed part of the search for mechanisms of neutralisation, 
depoliticization or even “disciplining” of wage conflicts. In other 
words, if it politicises the employers‟ class by accelerating the 
assertion of a legitimate political and social identity thereof in wage-
related transactions, it distances the treatment of social conflicts from 
strictly political arenas towards “spheres of public non-decision”, 
spheres “through which one directs the protagonists towards private 
initiative or negotiation”.100 In the case in hand, this does not indicate 
that there has not been any public policy in the matter, but rather that 
the public authorities have diverted workers‟ claims, directly 
addressed to them, towards badly-placed market institutions. 
Whatever the twists and turns of the “social dialogue” might be (a 
                                                        
99 Catusse 2005. 
100 Offerlé 1994, p. 135. 
  
25 
social dialogue which reeks more sometimes of a collective fiction to 
which few adhere, or even of propaganda, than of the real 
transformation of ad hoc practices of the treatment of conflicts), 
workers‟ unions and employers have acquired in the space of a few 
years a normative power and a certain autonomy solidly flanked by 
the executive instigator and arbiter. 
The speedy passage from the dominant paradigm of “class conflict” to 
that of “social dialogue” in the name of the “economic growth”, 
“securitisation” and “pacification” of society should not mislead. It 
represents less the transformation of social cleavages or the 
attenuation of conflicts inherent in capitalism than a change in the 
political vision of the possible and the thinkable. The mechanisms 
favoured for the regulation of wage conflicts borrow more readily 
from neo-corporatist representations of the social world. This change 
in regime, sensitive to the business environment, is organised around 
the promotion of “privatised” procedures and transactions. “Rather 
than isolating public action from private initiative”,101 on the contrary 
it unites and mixes them. The political mechanisms which emerge are 
based on a political engineering of social regulation according to 
which the administration wishes to arbitrate and transfers social 
demands and tensions to third parties, particularly industry leaders, 
who are identified as legitimate social forces. 
 
8.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has tried to explore the transformations of the economic 
capabilities of the Moroccan state in the face of the rapid liberalisation 
of its economy. The changes which its capitalism has undergone 
denote less a return of the market and a “retreat of the state”102 than a 
diversification and redeployment of public power by means of new 
techniques and modalities of the government of economic activity. 
The analysis of the different aspects of reform and privatisation shows 
in particular that if the sun of the state bourgeoisie is indeed “setting”, 
it is in the effects of contexts and generation rather than in the 
morphology of the social strictly speaking. What has changed? The 
social structures of the ancien régime have not been weakened by the 
structural adjustment but have showed themselves capable of 
adjustment and, in certain areas, have consolidated themselves. The 
heirs of the great families of the Souss region and of the city of Fez 
have been able to modernise their activities. Returning from studies 
abroad in Europe and increasingly in the United States, they are the 
“golden boys” of a rapidly-evolving capitalism who do not hide their 
success. Their sources of accumulation diversify: alongside 
inheritance and rentier proximity vis-à-vis the administration, new 
opportunities open up for them, as well as new risks, as customs 
protection crumbles, international competition becomes stiffer and the 
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state keeps hold of a certain arbitrage to rein in or encourage the 
affairs of this or that person. Alongside their triumphant success, the 
vast fabric of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) has also had to 
adapt, not without difficulty, in the spaces which have been 
restructured to a greater or lesser extent in the face of increasingly 
international competition. 
Rather than fall apart, the engineering of power has adjusted to the 
new constraints and opportunities. This does not mean that nothing 
has changed. We have seen on the contrary that a variety of shifts 
have taken place and that the normative system has evolved. At the 
end of the reign of Hassan II, the ministries opened their doors to the 
parties of historical opposition in a sort of consensual reconciliation. 
The tools of public action have been transformed, although in the end 
the Palace continues to exercise little-shared authority, while the 
business world in particular has increasing control over the 
instruments of fabrication of public goods. The “establishment of 
original mechanisms whose aim is to regulate the behaviour of 
individuals and to make new modes of constitution of private property 
and inequality possible” has pushed the political economy of the 
Kingdom towards a mode of “indirect private government”.103 
Alliances for profit are made and undone. As far as the political scene 
is concerned, it has pluralized, which does not necessarily indicate that 
the regime has become more pluralist. If according to the liberal ideal 
the state has less legitimacy in economic policy, the control exercised 
by the administration and the country‟s political leaders has changed 
without their losing their power of influence or coercion over the 
market. 
In this sense, social and economic policies in Morocco in the 2000s 
have a clear political significance, and their implementation cannot be 
reduced to questions of technical choice. The new institutions which 
have seen the light of day, explicitly straddling the “public” and the 
“private”, are in part “apolitical means of intermediation between the 
interests at stake, with the principal effect of reinforcing the strictly 
political prerogatives of final arbitrage, which is the principal means 
of control of the Moroccan monarchy”.104 Under the cover of 
managerial realism or economic efficiency, recourse to business –
virtual or real as the case may be– has served to marginalise political 
institutions and to de-ideologize the question. 
To finish with, one could also reflect with caution on how the 
hypothesis of a “third way” could be heuristically interesting for an 
understanding of the modes of regulation in play in the reform of 
economic policies by means of “less state”. Clearly, there is no 
question in this case of glimpsing the beginnings of a social 
democracy, dirigiste or liberal, between the contemporary 
transformations of capitalism, as Giddens
 
was able to do in other 
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contexts.
105
  Far from it. However, one can see in the case of Morocco 
that the reconstitutions of public action have been based on a model 
which goes down tracks close to those cleared by the British 
sociologist. This does not, of course, prejudge the local result of the 
reforms, but one must conclude that the privileged mode of political 
regulation values the individual who organises himself and builds up 
his own capital but entrusts to institutions the task of guaranteeing the 
quality of services by evaluating and measuring them and even by 
regulating them and arbitrating over them. Examination of recent 
social security policies in Morocco shows in particular a recourse to 
new tools and paradigms of action, whether it be in a localised manner 
or at national or even international level: contractualization versus 
institutionalisation; universalization/generalisation versus 
individualisation/commercialisation; insurance versus assistance; 
sectorization versus de-sectorization of public action. Original spheres 
of public action have been established for example in terms of wage 
negotiations, as the “social partners” became producers of norms in 
the context of the elaboration and adoption of a new Labour Code in 
2003, or even in terms of social policies, as the beginnings of a right 
to welfare have emerged. 
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